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 Mechanism Design with Incomplete
 Information: A Solution to the
 Implementation Problem
 Thomas R. Palfrey
 California Institute of Technology
 Sanjay Srivastava
 Carnegie-Mellon University
 The main result of this paper is that the m. ultiple equilibrium prob-
 lem in mechanism design can be avoided in private-value models if
 agents do not use weakly dominated strategies in equilibrium. We
 show that in such settings, any incentive-compatible allocation rule
 can be made the unique equilibrium outcome to a mechanism. We
 derive a general necessary condition for unique implementation that
 implies that the positive result for private-value models applies with
 considerably less generality to common-value settings.
 I. Introduction
 Institutions play a fundamental role in the organization of economic,
 political, and social activity. A central problem in the theory of institu-
 tions is the characterization of outcomes that can be achieved by in-
 stitutions. Mechanism design theory studies precisely this problem.
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 An institutional design problem arises whenever a group of indi-
 viduals with conflicting interests have to make a collective decision.
 One example of such a problem is the allocation of' public goods.
 Other examples include the design of auctions, constitutional design
 questions, organized markets such as stock exchanges, and, more gen-
 erally, contractual agreements between parties such as labor contracts
 and agency contracts. Since most economic, social, and political activ-
 ity is organized around institutions, a fundamental problem is the
 characterization of what institutions can achieve, that is, exactly which
 collective choices can be attained by institutions.
 An important practical reason for studying this characterization
 stems from the observation that most changes in policy actually
 change the institutional settings that govern activity. Changes often
 take place when the outcomes generated by existing institutions are
 perceived to be undesirable according to some welfare criterion. The
 question being posed here can be restated as, Given a welfare crite-
 rion, does there exist an institution that generates only outcomes that
 are satisfactory according to the welfare criterion? This question is
 also related to the line of reasoning employed in the Coase theorem,
 which asserts that if institutional arrangements are inadequate in the
 sense of leading to (Pareto) undesirable outcomes, rational agents will
 move toward an alternative institution that does not have undesirable
 outcomes. Our analysis can then be viewed as precisely characterizing
 when such alternative institutions exist. If they do exist, then the
 outcomes associated with the welfare criterion are said to be imple-
 mentable. More generally, we are interested in discovering the class of
 welfare criteria whose outcomes are implementable.
 The well-known difficulty in the design problem is that information
 relevant for determining a satisfactory outcome may be dispersed
 among the individuals involved. Consequently, in order to achieve an
 allocation rule that depends on this information (about preferences,
 endowments, priors over payoff-relevant states of the world, etc.), the
 rules of the institution must provide appropriate incentives for indi-
 viduals to share their information. This implies the basic principle of
 mechanism design with incomplete information, that any outcome
 that is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome to a mechanism (institu-
 tion) must satisfy an incentive compatibility condition (Myerson 1979;
 Harris and Townsend 1981).
 This principle further implies an important second idea, known as
 the revelation principle, that any incentive-compatible allocation rule
 can be made an equilibrium outcome of a very simple type of game: a
 direct game in which each individual is requested to report his private
 information. The outcome is then determined by the allocation rule,
 based exactly on the reported private information of all the individ-
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 uals. Incentive compatibility is simply the property that, for each indi-
 vidual, the best thing to do in this particular direct game is to report
 private information truthfully as long as all other individuals are also
 truthfully reporting their private information.
 This fundamental insight into mechanism design with incomplete
 information has allowed many allocation problems to be analyzed and
 forms the basis for the modern theory of second-best welfare analysis
 (Holmstrom and Myerson 1983; Prescott and Townsend 1984; Laf-
 font 1985). This insight provided a major technical breakthrough
 because the analysis of Pareto-optimal allocations in economies with
 private information could be tractably formulated as a standard pro-
 gramming problem: maximizing a planner's objective function sub-
 ject to the usual constraints, augmented by an additional set of incen-
 tive constraints. Furthermore, the revelation principle suggested
 properties of actual institutions that would be capable of' producing
 these optimal allocations. In this way, the formal analysis of' welfare
 economics and institutions was brought under a single unified ap-
 proach.
 Unfortunately, there is a serious caveat to the "revelation principle"
 link between institutions and welfare analysis. Incentive compatibility
 does not imply any restrictions on individual incentives in the direct
 revelation game if other individuals are not telling the truth (Postlewaite
 and Schmeidler 1987). Consequently, there can (and often will) exist
 other equilibrium outcomes to the direct game that are undesirable
 (e.g., by the criterion of' Pareto optimality). There exist several promi-
 nent examples of' this problem (Demski and Sappington [1984] and
 Bhattacharya [1987] in reference to incentive contracts, Milgrom
 [1981] in auctions, and Palfrey and Srivastava [1987] in the imple-
 mentation of' rational expectations equilibria) that threaten the value
 of this whole approach to mechanism design.
 These recent examples illustrate that the implementation problem
 has two equally important aspects. In order to implement an alloca-
 tion rule, a mechanism must be constrained not only by the property
 that it has an equilibrium that produces desirable outcomes but also
 by the property that other undesirable outcomes do not arise as equilibria.
 Thus the work associated with the revelation principle has elegantly
 proved that incentive compatibility is a necessary condition for imn-
 plementation, but the examples cited above indicate that incentive
 compatibility may not be a sufficient condition.
 In this paper, we show that this multiplicity problem can be solved
 in the large and important class of environments in which private
 information is of the "private-values" variety; that is, each individual's
 utility depends only on the outcome and his or her own private infor-
 mation. To achieve this result, a mild refinement of Bayesian Nash
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 equilibrium is adopted and more complex institutions than "direct
 games" are required. Thus we simultaneously provide a sufficiency
 proof' of incentive compatibility for unique implementation in a broad
 class of environments and also, via a constructive proof, indicate how
 our solution may have implications for the details of' institutional
 design.
 II. Relation to the Literature
 In attempts to resolve problems of' multiple equilibria in games, two
 approaches have been followed in the literature. One approach at-
 tempts to eliminate multiple equilibria by refining the notion of' equi-
 librium (e.g., Selten 1975; Grossman and Perry 1986; Kohlberg and
 Mertens 1986; Banks and Sobel 1987; Cho and Kreps 1987). The
 second approach asks whether, given an equilibrium concept, the
 mechanism being played by the agents can be designed so as to elimi-
 nate undesirable equilibria while retaining desirable ones (see Das-
 gupta, Hammond, and Maskin 1979; Maskin 1985; Postlewaite 1985;
 Postlewaite and Schmeidler 1986; Palfrey and Srivastava 1987, in
 press).
 This paper continues a line of' inquiry followed by Palfrey and
 Srivastava (1986) and Moore and Repullo (1988) that merged these
 two approaches and asked whether flexibility in mechanism design
 together with a refined equilibrium concept could resolve the multi-
 plicity problem when problems of asymmetric information are absent
 (i.e., in complete information environments). Earlier applications of'
 this approach to specific complete information settings can be found
 in Crawford (1979), Moulin (1979), and Reichelstein (1985). Our re-
 sult is that in a large class of' settings with asymmetric information, all
 multiplicity problems can be resolved with a simple strengthening of'
 Bayesian Nash equilibrium: equilibrium in which no individual uses a
 weakly dominated strategy. This is a mild condition since a weakly
 dominated strategy is always (weakly) inferior to some other strategy
 regardless of the strategies employed by the other players and is
 strictly inferior for some strategies others might use. An important
 reason for using this refinement is that Bayesian Nash equilibrium
 places insufficient restrictions on behavior, leading to the implausible
 use of weakly dominated strategies. This is illustrated clearly by ex-
 ample 2 of' Section IV and is precisely the type of' behavior excluded
 by our refinement.
 The domain restrictions we impose are that no agent is ever com-
 pletely indifferent over all alternatives, values are private, and there
 are at least three agents. We do not require a "no veto power" condi-
 tion (as in, e.g., Maskin [1977] and Abreu and Sen [1986]). 'I'he proof
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 consists in augmenting a direct mechanism and specifying outcomes
 so that the desired incentive-compatible allocation rule is the unique
 equilibrium outcome to the game.
 Our possibility result stands in sharp contrast to previous results on
 implementation with incomplete information. Palfrey and Srivastava
 (in press), extending the earlier analysis of Postlewaite and Schmeid-
 ler (1986), show that a condition called Bayesian monotonicity is nec-
 essary for implementation in (unrefined) Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
 As shown in Palfrey and Srivastava (1987), many "nice" allocation
 rules do not satisfy this condition even if the domain of application is
 restricted to the set of pure exchange economies. In Section IV of this
 paper, we provide the even more striking example of an allocation
 rule that is implementable in dominant strategies but not in Bayesian
 Nash equilibrium.
 With complete information, several positive results have been ob-
 tained. Maskin (1977) showed that a condition termed monotonicity is
 necessary for Nash implementation and, together with a no veto
 power condition and at least three agents, is also sufficient (Saijo
 1988). Monotonicity is satisfied by many economically interesting sets
 of allocation rules. For example, the correspondence that associates
 each pure exchange neoclassical economy with the set of Pareto-
 optimal redistributions is monotonic, as is the (constrained) Walrasian
 correspondence. However, most allocation rules (i.e., single-valued
 correspondences) are not monotonic and thus not Nash implement-
 able. Moore and Repullo (1988) (see also Abreu and Sen 1986) show
 that the class of implementable allocation rules expands significantly
 if the mechanism is played sequentially and subgame perfection is
 imposed on the equilibrium. Palfrey and Srivastava (1986) have since
 shown that if there are at least three players and complete indiffer-
 ence is ruled out, then all allocation rules are implementable in Nash
 equilibrium if weakly dominated strategies are not used. This paper is
 then an extension of our previous results to incomplete information
 environments with private values. What is surprising is that our previ-
 ous results extend in a straightforward manner, in contrast to the
 failure of positive Nash implementation results to extend to Bayesian
 Nash implementation (Palfrey and Srivastava 1987).
 Our general possibility result with private values does not extend
 easily to common-value environments, in which an agent's prefer-
 ences may depend on other agents' types, or to models in which an
 agent's type only indexes the agent's information about other agents.
 We derive a necessary condition for unique implementation in gen-
 eral environments and provide an example with common values,
 which illustrates the strength of the necessary condition, highlights
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 the difficulties arising in these situations, and indicates why positive
 results in this domain will be more limited.
 The private-values model is described in Section III. In Section IV,
 we provide examples to show why direct mechanisms are generally
 not sufficient for implementation and also why we need to use
 refinements of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Our central possibility re-
 sult is given in Section V, while extensions to common values are
 considered in Section VI.
 III. The Model
 We employ the widely used private-values model in which agents are
 incompletely informed about the preferences of other agents. There
 are I agents, and T' denotes the set of possible types for agent i. A type
 for agent i, t,, specifies the preferences of i and also i's information
 about other agents. The term A is an arbitrary set of alternatives, and
 U1Q, t) the utility function of agent i if he is of type t, E TV. Let T = T'
 x T2 x ... X T'. An allocation rule is a function x: T-* A. Let X = {x:
 T -- A} be the set of all allocation rules.
 Each agent is assumed to know his own type but not necessarily that
 of any other agent. The prior distribution over types is given by a
 distribution q on T. To simplify notation, we assume that the support
 of ql(t It -) equals T" for all i and t. This implies that the type of any
 agent is purely private information in the sense that even by pooling
 the information of all agents except i, i's type cannot be narrowed
 down.
 Given an allocation rule x E X, the (interim) expected utility to i
 conditional on ti is denoted by
 VI(x, tj) = UJ1[x(t-i, t1), ti]dq(t t1).
 DEFINITION 1. A mechanism is a pair (M, g), M M' X M2 x ... X
 MI and g: M A.
 The term M' is the message space of i, while g is the outcome function. If
 MI = T' for all i, then (M, g) is a direct mechanism.
 DEFINITION 2. A strategy for agent i is a function (&: T' -> MI.
 Given a joint strategy o = (a- 1. ,I), we denote by g(u) the
 outcome generated by u, where the outcome at t is g(u(t)). The ques-
 tion being posed in this paper can now be formulated precisely: Given
 an equilibrium concept and an allocation rule, say x, does there exist a
 mechanism that has x as its unique equilibrium outcome? Following
 the implementation literature, if there exists such a mechanism, we
 say that the allocation rule is implementable.
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 We will study implementation using two concepts of equilibrium.
 These are as follows. Let ((Al ('. -1 rU +l. l) so
 (('a & a).
 DEFINITION 3. (i) (o' is a best response for i to f' if, for all ti,
 V,'), tJ ? V'[g(o ', CT'), tJ] for all i': T' Ml';
 (ii) (- is a Bayesian equilibrium if (&' is a best response to (-' for all i.
 DEFINITION 4. u is weakly dominated if there exist i, t., and C: T M
 such that V [g(dr', CT(t,)), t,] V'[g(d-', o-'(t,)), t,] for all CT' with strict
 inequality for some d('.
 This says that no matter what strategies are used by the others,
 agent i does at least as well at t- by using &rl(t,) instead of u' (t1), while for
 some strategy combination of the others, he does strictly better at ti by
 using Cr'(ti).
 DEFINITION 5. u is an undominated Bayesian equilibrium ift is a Bayes-
 ian equilibrium and a is not weakly dominated.
 It is clear that any allocation rule that can be made the unique
 equilibrium outcome to a mechanism must satisfy an incentive com-
 patibility condition. This is immediate from the literature on Bayesian
 incentive compatibility (e.g., Myerson 1979; Harris and Townsend
 1981).
 DEFINITION 6. x: T -* A is incentive compatible if for all i, for all ti,
 U(x(ti, t1), t,)dq(t t,) '; U'(x(ti, t,'), t1)dq(t t,) for all t' E T'.
 The following result is well known.
 THEOREM 1. If x is implementable, then x is incentive compatible.
 IV. Eliminating Equilibria by Indirect
 Mechanisms
 To begin our analysis, we consider implementation using Bayesian
 equilibrium as the solution concept. We start with an example show-
 ing how indirect mechanisms help alleviate the multiple equilibrium
 problem.
 Example 1.-Consider a pure exchange economy with two goods, an
 aggregate endowment w E R 2, and two agents. Agent 1 can be of two
 types, T1 = {t,, t'}, while agent 2 has only one type, so T 2 {t2}.
 Preferences are as in figure 1, and each type of agent 1 is equally
 likely. Consider the allocation rule given in figure 1. It is easy to check
 that x is incentive compatible, and it is also (ex post) Pareto optimal.
 The direct mechanism is Ml = T', M2 = T2, so the game can be
 written as follows:
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.115 on Mon, 07 Mar 2016 23:24:11 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 675
 Agent 2
 x ( t)
 x \t
 Agent 1
 t=(t1,t2) = (tt, t2)
 Fi(c. I
 Agent 2
 Agent 1 t2
 t1 x(t)
 t', x(t')
 Truth telling is clearly an equilibrium to this game, yielding x as the
 truthful equilibrium outcome. However, this game has another equi-
 librium, one in which agent 1 says t1 independently of his type. This is
 an equilibrium because at t' agent 1 is indifferent between x(t) and
 x(t'). Unfortunately, agent 2 is not indifferent between this strategy
 and the truthful one: he strictly prefers the outcome when agent 1
 reports truthfully. Further, if agent 1 always reports t1, the outcome
 at t' is inefficient.
 In order to overcome this problem, we can attempt to expand the
 strategy sets of the agents (use an indirect mechanism) or refine the
 concept of equilibrium (or both). In this particular example,
 refinements such as undominated equilibrium, (trembling-hland) per-
 fect equilibrium, or proper equilibrium do not rule out the bad equi-
 librium in the direct mechanism since they would all rely on possible
 mistakes made by agent 2. Since agent 2 has only one strategy, the
 refinements do not help. We now show that a simple indirect mecha-
 nism can eliminate the problem in this example.
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 Consider adding a strategy for agent 2, say N, with the following
 outcomes:
 Agent 2
 Agent 1 t2 N
 tj x(t) x(t')
 t 'I x(t') x(t)
 Now note that if 1 always plays ti, 2 should play N, in which case 1
 should play t' when he is of type ti. Thus the bad equilibrium has
 been eliminated. It can be verified that there are two equilibria to this
 game:
 al(tj) =to, al(t,) = ttl, Id= 2
 and
 o-'(t1) ti, I'(tj) t1, u2 = N.
 In either equilibrium, the outcome at t is x(t), and that at t' is x(t').
 In this example, then, a simple extension of the mechanism imple-
 mented the desired allocation rule. This naturally raises the question
 of when indirect mechanisms by themselves are sufficient to imple-
 ment desirable allocation rules.
 To answer this question, consider an incentive-compatible alloca-
 tion rule x. The associated direct mechanism is M' T' for all i, and
 g(t) = x(t) for all t. Incentive compatibility ensures that truth telling is
 an equilibrium to this direct game, yielding x as the truthful equilib-
 rium outcome. As in the example, however, there may be other
 equilibria to the direct mechanism, and the question is whether these
 can be eliminated by expanding the mechanism. To examine what
 these equilibria might be, we first need to examine all possible strate-
 gies agents might use. In a direct mechanism, any strategy for agent i
 is a function from T' into T', say (x': T'-- T'. Truth telling is simply the
 identity function. We call &i a deception by i, the interpretation being
 that when i is of' type ti, he acts as if he is of type &(t,).
 In the example, the "bad" equilibrium strategy by agent 1 was the
 deception ao(t1) = t, a(tf) = t1. With this notation, incentive com-
 patibility can be rewritten as, for all i, for all t., and for all a: T' T-
 JUI(x(t~i ti) t )dq(t it) 'JU'(x(t i, tx(t), t .)dq(t_ ati
 This is the standard incentive compatibility condition and says that if
 in a direct mechanism all other agents are using truthful strategies,
 then the truthful strategy does at least as well for agent i as any
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 deception. Notice that incentive compatibility does not say what is a
 best response when other agents are playing deceitfully.
 Let ot = (ot I 'tI)and o'= (tI . ot2. ot I oti+1 . )
 that a = (&-, ot). Then every candidate for equilibrium in the direct
 game is a (joint) deception a. If a is being used, the outcome to the
 direct game is x, where x,(t) = x(ot(t)) for all t. If a is an equilibrium
 and x, = x, then we have an undesired outcome to the direct game.
 The question being posed can now be rephrased to ask when it is
 possible to add strategies to the direct game so that any a with x,c # x is
 not an equilibrium. To answer this, fix a such that x, # x. For any
 agent i, consider giving him an additional message, say mi. For each t,
 let y(t-I, at(ti)) = g(t1, Imn), the outcome when i plays m' and the other
 agents play t_ To ensure that a is not an equilibrium, we want agent i
 to play m' when the other agents are playing a-'. If i plays m' and the
 others use oa-, the outcome at t isy('(ti), &(ti)). If i uses & and the
 others use ai the outcome at t is x(t-'(ti), o(t1)). Thus x, is an
 equilibrium outcome unless, at some ti,
 U"(x(oti(t) ot'(t1)), t )dq(tti) K< LU(y(t '(ti), ot'(t1)), t1)dq(t, t).
 If there exist i, ti, and y such that the inequality above is satisfied, then
 (x cannot be an equilibrium since agent i will deviate to m'. However,
 we must also be careful that introducing m' does not lead to x not
 being an equilibrium outcome; that is, we still want truth telling to be
 an equilibrium. Thus we must also have that, for all t,' E T
 Ul(x(t-,i, t,'), t' )dq(t_ i t )- U '(y(t-,i, ot'(t,)), t1 )dq(t t _ ').
 Defining y,(t) = y(o-'(ti), o&(ti)), we arrive at the condition called
 Bayesian monotonicity, which is necessary for implementation.
 DEFINITION 7. x: T -- A satisfies Bayesian monotonicity if, for any
 deception a such that x,(t) # x(t) for some t, there exist i, t., and an
 allocation rule y: T -- A such that
 U'(x(t_ i, tl'), tl')dq(t t' ) U'(y(t,, (t)), t' )dq(t I | tI I) for all tI
 and
 (x, (ti ti), ti.)dq (t_ i I ti) < JU'(y, (ti ti.), ti) dq (t -i|ti.)
 The next example shows that appealing to indirect mechanisms
 alone will generally not be enough to solve the implementation prob-
 lem.
 Example 2.-I = 3, A = {a, b}, and T' {ta, tb} for all i. Types are
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 independently drawn with q(tb) = q for all i and q2 > .5. Preferences
 are as follows: type ta strictly prefers a to b, while type th strictly prefers
 b to a. Normalize utility so that U'(a, ta) = 1 > 0 = U'(b, ta) and U'(b, tb)
 - 1 > 0 = U'(a, tb). Consider the following allocation rule, x:
 2 is 2 is
 1 is t4 1 is t', t,
 a a a b
 th a b t1, b b
 3 is t, 3 is tb
 This allocation rule has many nice properties and, indeed, is the only
 reasonable allocation rule in that (i) it is incentive compatible; (ii) it is
 ex ante efficient, interim efficient, durable, and ex post efficient in the
 sense of Holmstrom and Myerson (1983); (iii) x(t) is the (unique)
 majority winner at t; (iv) it maximizes an Arrow social welfare func-
 tion; and (v) it can be implemented in dominant strategies by a direct
 mechanism.
 Remarkably, x is not implementable in Bayesian equilibrium: let
 xl (t.) =tb for all i, so x(a(t)) = b for all t. We show below that there do
 not exist i, y, and t, that satisfy the inequalities required by Bayesian
 monotonicity. Consequently, in any game in which a is a Bayesian
 an elibrium with g(o) = x, ac is also a Bayesian equilibrium with g(u)
 = x.. This has severe welfare implications since xc, - b violates proper-
 ties ii, iii, and iv.
 To show that Bayesian monotonicity is not satisfied requires us to
 prove that there does not exist y: T -* A that satisfies the first set of
 inequalities in definition 7, with y, simultaneously satisfying the sec-
 ond inequality. To see this, note first that since a is a "projection" to tb,
 ye is a constant allocation rule. Furthermore, if y,(t) = b for all t, then
 x, = y, in which case the second inequality could not be satisfied, so
 we can limit attention to y's such that y,(t) = a for all t. Since a is the
 worst element for type tb, the inequality
 JU1(xX,(t_1i, ti), t1)dq(t_- iIt1-) < JU'(yx(t_1-i, ti), t1i)dq(t 1- iIt1i)
 implies t/ = ta. Further, since (x(t) = (tb, tb, tb), we must have y(tb, tb, tb)
 - a. By our choice of y(tb, t, th), the second inequality of definition 7 is
 satisfied for all i when i is type t4. We need to show that the other
 elements of y cannot be picked to satisfy the first inequality of
 definition 7. Since the problem is symmetric, we need consider only
 agent 1. The expected utility from x at to is 1 - q2 while that from
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 y(t ox'1(t,)) at t, is
 (1 - q)2U'(y(th, t0, t(7), to) + 2q(1 - q)U'(y(th,, th, tj), to)
 + q2 U I(y(tb,4 t6,), t ) ).
 Since y(tb, tb, tb) = a, this reduces to
 q2 + (1 - q)2L/'(y(tb, t0, to), t01) + 2q(l - q)Ul(y(tb, tb, t(7), t01).
 The minimum value of this last expression over y is q , which is
 greater than 1 - q2, so the first inequality of Bayesian monotonicity
 must be violated when agent 1 is of type t,. Hence x is not implement-
 able.
 Palfrey and Srivastava (1987) present several more examples of'
 reasonable allocation rules that are not Bayesian implementable even
 in pure exchange economies. These include allocation rules defined
 by various notions of optimality and by various notions of equity and
 fairness. In the next section, we show that these problems may be
 solved when indirect mechanisms are used together with our mild
 refinement of Bayesian equilibrium.
 V. Undominated Bayesian Equilibrium
 In this section, using Bayesian equilibria that do not involve the use of'
 weakly dominated strategies, we prove the central result of the paper:
 Any allocation rule that satisfies incentive compatibility can be made the
 unique equilibrium outcome to a mechanism in a large class of models.
 The next definition summarizes a restriction on the environment.
 It says that there are no redundant preference types for any agent in
 the sense that if two types are different, then their preferences over
 some pair of alternatives must be different.
 DEFINITION 8. Value-distinguished types.-For all i, t, t', and t4 #& t',
 either there exist y z' E A with U'(y', t) ? U'(z', t) and U'(y', t4') < U'(z',
 t;') or there exist y', z' E A with U'(y', ti) > U'(z', ti) and U'(y', tC') ' U (z ,
 t; ).
 In some applications, value distinction may require us to consider
 random allocation rules. This will be the case if, for example, the
 difference between types is the difference in risk aversion. In this
 case, types are value distinguished on the set of' lotteries over A.
 Therefore, one may think of A more generally as a set of lotteries and
 the U'( ) as preferences over lotteries.
 Our sufficiency result requires us also to impose the following two
 mild restrictions on the domain of possible types. The first states that
 there is no type for whom all alternatives give equal utility. The sec-
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 ond is that each type has a most preferred and a least preferred
 alternative. The latter is implied, for example, if each UP is continuous
 and A is compact.
 DEFINITION 9. (i) No complete indifference. -For all i and t,, there exist
 a, b E A with U'(a, t1) > UP(b, t.). (ii) Existence of best and worst elements.-
 For all i and t-, there exist b(t-), w(t-) E A with U'(b(t,), t) U'(a, t) for
 all a E A and U' (a, t )-U (w(t-), t-) for all a E A.
 THEOREM 2. Assume that I 3, that there is no complete indiffer-
 ence, that best and worst elements exist, and that types are value
 distinguished. If x is incentive compatible, then x can be made the
 unique undominated Bayesian equilibrium outcome to a mechanism.
 The Appendix contains a formal proof of theorem 2 and a detailed
 construction of a general implementing mechanism. Here we give the
 intuition behind the construction of the mechanismn and explain how
 it works.
 Following the intuition behind the examples of the previous sec-
 tion, we see that the mechanism is, effectively, a direct mechanism
 with some additional strategies appended in a way that eliminate un-
 desirable equilibria. Each agent submits a message that has four com-
 ponents. The first component is from the "direct" part of the message
 space: Ml = T'. The second component is either a second report of
 one's own type or a report of someone else's type. The third compo-
 nent of the message space is a half-open real interval that is used in
 the mechanism to break ties. The fourth component is a requested
 outcome. Formally, let
 I = MI, x MI x Ml x MI,
 where M' = TI, M' - U, T', Ml = [O, I + 2), and Ma = A. The key
 aspect of the mechanism is that, except for specific isolated portions
 of M, the outcome function, g, is essentially direct in that it depends
 only on the first component of each agent's report. Calling this region
 Do, we have g(m) =x(m1) for all m E D(. The remainder of M is
 divided into I subregions indexed by i. In such a region, Di, m2 = ti E
 T' for allj # i. The outcome function in such a region is given in ta-
 ble 1.
 The entries in the table are to be interpreted as follows. The four-
 tuples defining columns and rows are strategy choices by agent i (col-
 umns) and by all other agents (rows). We have denoted by ai* the
 outcome requested by the agent (i*) who wins the tie-breaking proce-
 dure as determined by M3. The outcomes yI(ti, t,') and y2(ti, t,') are a
 pair of' allocations for which i's preferences differ depending on
 whether i is type t, or t4'. The existence of the pair is guaranteed by the
 assumption of value-distinguished types. In fact, the proof given in
 the Appendix is only for strictly value-distinguished types. Therefore,
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 TABLE 1
 OUTCOME FUNCTION RESTRICTED TrO REGION D
 MESSAGE OF AGENTI
 (ti, ti, ki, a,), ki > ?,
 MESSAGE OF ALLj $ i (1, t1, 0, a,) (1,, k,, a,) or (t1, 1,, k,, a,),j $ i
 1.- (tj, ti, kj, aj),
 k, E [I + 1, I + 2) a, a, a,*
 2. (tj, t,', kj,aj),
 kE [I + 1,I + 2) y1(ti, ,1) y2(t1ltt') a,*
 3. (tj, C,'kj, aj),
 k -[I + 1,I + 2),
 t,' Iti, t,} Iy (t, t,',) a r,
 4 . (tj, ti, kj, aj),
 kjE [i, i + 1) a, a, (t,)
 5. (tj, t,' kj, aj),
 k e [i,+ 1),
 $t" 3 tI w(t,-') w(t') 7 )
 6. All other messages
 with m= I E T ai a,* a,*
 yl(t., t') and y2(t', t') have the property that U'(y(t4, t'), t4) > U'(y2(t4, t),
 ti) but U'(y2(ti, t'), tz ) > U'(yI(ti, tz'), t; ). Straightforward methods for
 extending the mechanism to account for weak value distinction are
 contained in Palfrey and Srivastava (1986).
 The proof then proceeds in three steps: (1) all equilibria must lie in
 Do, (2) all equilibria must involve "truthful" reports (i.e., m' = for all
 i, 4), and (3) the joint strategy where -'(t4) = (t, t, 0, b(t)) for all i is an
 equilibrium.
 To prove step 1, we show that no equilibrium can lie in D' for any i.
 Suppose that agent i is of type ti. Note first that reporting m4 = a with
 Uz(a, ti) < Uz(b(t4), ti) is weakly dominated; changing a to b(ti) is strictly
 better for i at several m - , and if the rest of m' is unaltered, i is never
 worse off. Without loss of generality, then, suppose that m' = b(t4).
 Next, we note that there is no equilibrium with k1 > 0 for some i. To
 see this, suppose thatJ c ki <J + 1 for some nonnegative integerJ '
 I + 1 and k. # 0. Then (k, + J + 1)/2 weakly dominates since i is
 strictly better off somewhere in the bottom row of the table and no
 worse off anywhere.
 A similar argument applies for i if m2 # m'. We conclude that all
 equilibria must lie in Do, with m 0 = and ml = ml for allj.
 The next step is to observe that at t, playing (ti, ti, 0, b(t4)) with t' t 4
 is weakly dominated by (ti, tz , ki, b(t')). This change alters the outcome
 only in rows 2, 3, and 6. In row 2, the outcome changes from yl(t, 4')
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 to y2(tz, t'). By construction, U'(y2(t,, t), tI) > U I(y (4, t), 4-), so i is
 better off. In rows 3 and 6, i is never worse off.
 Hence the only possible equilibrium is o'(tL) = (ti, tL, 0, b(t-)) for all
 and ti. To see that this is indeed an undominated Bayesian equilib-
 rium, we first note that incentive compatibility implies that when all]j
 ' i play a-, a' is a best response for i since a unilateral deviation by
 can change the outcome only from x(t) to x(ti, t') at t. To see that it is
 not weakly dominated, we have to consider each possible deviation by
 i and all possible strategies by others. These cases are covered in detail
 in the Appendix and are easily checked by inspection of the table.
 To conclude, the only equilibria are o'(t1) = (ti, ti, 0, bi) for all i and
 ti, where bi is a best element at ti, and all these equilibria yield x as the
 outcome. Hence, this mechanism implements x. If' some individual
 has more than one best element, then there are multiple equilibria,
 but all equilibria produce x as the outcome. Furthermore, the equilib-
 rium strategies are "interchangeable" since they differ only in the last
 component of the message space.
 VI. Common Values
 The most significant assumption in theorem 2 is private values. Even
 though a large majority of applications to date of Bayesian games to
 economic problems and applications of the revelation principle to
 mechanism design have used this assumption, it is clearly quite re-
 strictive. Our general possibility result does not apply with nearly the
 same force in settings with common values, which we now discuss.
 The model itself is easily modified to incorporate common values.
 To do this, we write the utility function of agent i at t as U'(, t) instead
 of U'(, 4), but we still assume that, at t, i observes only t4 and that there
 is no moving support. Economic examples of common-value alloca-
 tion problems include oil lease auctions studied by Wilson (1977) and
 others and oligopoly with private information about demand studied
 by Palfrey (1985) and others. In the auction, n bidders submit com-
 petitive bids for the right to drill for oil at a specified location. The oil
 they drill for has a common value to all bidders, but they differ in
 their (correlated) private estimates of how much oil will be found and
 recovered. In the oligopoly setting, firms face a common demand
 curve for a homogeneous product but have different (correlated)
 estimates of the parameters of the demand curve. These estimates are
 privately known. In both of these examples, ti corresponds to an indi-
 vidual estimate, and U' corresponds to a conditional expected value of
 the oil or output, net of an accepted bid or production costs. This
 conditional expectation will generally be different when conditioned
 on the entire vector of estimates rather than being conditioned only
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 on one's own private estimate. For this reason U' is a function of t
 instead of just t1. The definition of incentive compatibility is now
 modified accordingly.
 DEFINITION 6'. x is incentive compatible if' for all i, for all ti,
 {Ui(x(t t, 4), t)dq(t t)-I U'(x(t i, C), t)dq(t 4t) for all tj E T.
 Let V'(y, t) = f U'(y(ti, t), t)dq(tl tt). The following theorem yields
 a necessary condition for implementing an allocation rule.
 THEOREM 3. If x is implementable in undominated Bayesian equi-
 librium, then x is incentive compatible, and for any (x: T-- T, x,,(t) #
 x(t) for some t implies that at least one of the following conditions
 holds: (a) There exist i, ti, and y E X with
 U'(x (t it,'), t ,,t,' dq (t i , -t U'(y (t iot'(t), t it,' dq (t i|t,'
 for all tJ E T, and
 UI(Xa(t isti tri t )dq(t iti) < Ul(y'e(t i ti), t i t.)dq(t I~t.).
 (b) There exist i, ti, andYl, Y2e Z1, z2 E X with
 V`(Y1, Ot'(0i) > V'(Yo2, Ot'(0i),
 Vi (Y I A, tl') --V i(Y2P), ti)
 for all deceptions 1 with Al = (x',
 V' (ZI, ti) > V' (z2o ti),
 and
 V'(zPl, tI) VI(Z'p, tI
 for all deceptions 3 with i = (xi. (c) There exist i, ti, and y I, y2 E X with
 Vi(y I, O(ti)) = V'(y2, Oi(ti)),
 Vi(yI, 0) < V'(y2, ti),
 and
 Vi(YIP, tl') 'V'(Y2P, tI
 for all deceptions 1 with 1' = ('.
 Proof. See the Appendix.
 With private values, parts b and c of this result reduce to the state-
 ment that types are value distinguished. For example, consider part b.
 In this case, we inust have U'(y I (ti, t'), t/') > U'(y2(t_, t/'), tC) for some
 t where t,' = o&'(ti). Now, consider 1-'(ti) = tl for all ti, yielding
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 Ul(yI(t1, tl ), ti) ' U'(y2(t-1, tl'), ti), which says that t, and tj are value
 distinguished. The assumption of no complete indifference yields the
 existence of z1 and Z2 satisfying the requirements of the condition.
 Except in private-values models, conditions b and c appear to be
 very strong, in fact sufficiently strong that they seem unlikely to be
 satisfied in general applications. This suggests that undominated
 Bayesian implementation is not that different from (unrefined)
 Bayesian implementation once one moves beyond private-value do-
 mains with value-distinguished types.
 The following example, which is a variant of our earlier example,
 illustrates the difficulties arising with common values.
 Example 3.-A = {a, b}, I = 3, T2 = {tJ, tb} for all i, and types are
 independently drawn with q'(tb) = q for all i and q2 > .5. The agents
 have "majoritarian" preferences, given by
 1i~t) =f 1 if at least two agents are type ta
 'a, =10 otherwise,
 U'(b, t) = J 1 if at least two agents are type tb
 Ul', t 0 otherwise.
 With this structure of preferences, all agents are ex post identical.
 The following incentive-compatible allocation rule, x, is (uniquely)
 efficient in all senses and, for each t, picks out the unanimous socially
 preferred outcome:
 2 is 2 is
 1is ta tb 1is tel tb
 to] a a ta a b
 th a b tb b b
 3 is toa3 is tb
 Surprisingly, this allocation rule is not implementable in undominated
 Bayesian equilibrium. To see this, consider o&'(t.) = tb for all i, so x,(t)
 - b for all t, as in example 1. We claim that for any mechanism, if x is
 an undominated Bayesian equilibrium outcome, then xy is also an
 undominated Bayesian equilibrium outcome. A proof is given in the
 Appendix.
 Appendix
 Proof of Theorem 2
 We divide the message space as follows:
 DI = fmlmE T' for allj},
 D2 = {ml there does not exist i and t, E T1 with mi) = t V j i}.
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 Let
 DI = {ml there exists tI, T' with m = t Vj i}.
 Note that M \ (D1 U D2) UV= I DI. Let
 D'3A = {m E DjIj V i, ml2 $ ml, ml E [I + 1, I + 2); ml = m', ml =0,
 D3B = {m E DIIj i,m2 = ml, ml E [I + 1, I + 2); ml ml, ml =0,
 DI = {m E DIVji, mj = m', ml [I + 1, I + 2); mil $m},
 D = {m E DIVj $ i, mj2 l ml, ml $ m', ml E [I + 1, + 2); ml $ m },
 D5 = {m E DI~j I i, mJ2 = ml, m3 E? [i, i + 1)},
 D5A = {m E D'I Im' $ ml or ml = ml and ml 7$ O},
 D6 = {all other m}.
 For m E D6, let i* be the smallest i such that ms- ml3 for allj, and let a.* = i4.
 The outcome function is given by
 x(t) if m E D1 and ml t
 x(t) if m E D2 andm = t
 yl(t, t4') if m E D3A and ml = t, ml = t Vj i
 a. ifm D3B and m4 = a.
 g(m) = y2(tl, tI') if m E D4 and ml = t 2, m = tVj i
 ai if m I D4B and ml = a
 a, if m Ez D IA and m4 = a,
 w(t-) if m E D \D5A and mrn t, VIj $& i
 a,-* if m E D6.
 We start by showing that o-(t,) = (ti, ti, 0, b(ti)) for all i and t, which lies in D1
 for all t, is a Bayesian equilibrium. This can be seen by noting that a unilateral
 deviation by i from this strategy affects the outcome only if i changes mi.
 (Note that this would not be true if I = 2 since in that case D2 n (D' U D4) $X
 0.) If, at ti, i instead reports mli = t, the outcome at t is x(t,, t') instead of
 x(t-, t). Incentive compatibility now directly implies that r is a Bayesian
 equilibrium.
 Next, we argue that (r is not weakly dominated. To see this, note first that
 not reporting a best element in the fourth component of the message is always
 weakly dominated since the report in this component is always used in an
 agent's favor. Without loss of generality, therefore, we assume that m. = b(t,)
 for all i, 4.
 Next, we consider four possible types of deviations by i at 1, and show that
 none of these deviations weakly dominates (t,, ti, 0, b(ti)). (i) ml =X t$ : In this
 case, i is strictly worse off when ml = (/j, 1,, i, a,) for all j $ i since the outcome
 moves from b(tl) to w(t4). (ii) ml = (t4, ti, ki, b(ti)), k- > 0: Again, i is strictly worse
 off when ml = (t1, 4, i, aj) for allj $7 i. (iii) m' = (4, tj, k-, b(t4)),j $ i: In this case, i
 is again strictly worse off when mi = (t1, t, i, a.) for allj $ i since the outcome
 changes from b(t4) to w(t4). (iv) ml = (t4, t/', k-, b(t)), t4' $& t4: Here i is strictly worse
 off when ml = (tj, t4, I + 1, a1) since the outcome changes from yI(t4, t4') toy2(t4,
 tI). We conclude that r is an undominated Bayesian equilibrium, yielding x as
 the outcome.
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 We now argue that there are no other equilibria, thereby concluding that x
 is the unique equilibrium outcome. This is argued in two steps: first, that all
 undominated equilibria are of the form r(t,) (ti, t;', 0, b(t-)) and, second,
 that t' $& tI is weakly dominated.
 First, note that there is no equilibrium at t with mi > 0 for some i. To see
 this, let J be an integer such that J < ml < J + 1. Then, reporting m' =h
 except ?ih = (ml + J + 1)/2 weakly dominates reporting ml since there is a con-
 figuration of messages in D6 such that g(m -', ml) = w(t,) but g(m, ml) Ml4
 b(t), and no configuration of messages such that UY(g(m), ti) > Ul(g(m -i
 mli), 1). Second, &r(t,) (t, ti, 0, b(t)) is weakly dominated by '(t1) (t1' t1,
 1/2, b(tI)) and o(14) = (1, t$', 0, b(tI)) with I' & t17 is weakly dominated by `(t1)
 (t; tC I/2, b(tl)). This leaves only (T'(1,) = (t', 1 0, b.), where b, is a best element at
 tI. We claim that ml (t, ,k, &9) weakly dominates this strategy. The outcome
 changes only in D3 and Dei. In D3, the outcome changes from yI(t', tI) to y2(t',
 t1), so i is strictly better off since U'(y2(1 t), 1,) > U(yi(t.1, 1t), t1); i is no worse off
 in D6. This concludes the proof of theorem 2.
 Proof of Theorem 3
 The revelation principle implies that x is incentive compatible. Let (M, g)
 implement x, let r be an equilibrium with g(r) = x, and let xx $& x for some t.
 Then r,, yielding xQ as the outcome, is not an undominated Bayesian equilib-
 rium. Two cases arise: either o-. is not a Bayesian equilibrium or it is one. In
 the first case the argument showing Bayesian monotonicity is necessary, for
 Bayesian implementation yields condition a.
 Suppose, then, that (ra, is a Bayesian equilibrium. Then it must be weakly
 dominated, so there exist i, L, and Tm such that
 { U(g(dr - i, ), t)dq(t _ ) | { U(g( -, a (t)), i)dq(i i tI) (A 1)
 for all 0r with strict inequality holding for some 0-. Note that (1(t,) t , since
 otherwise r' (t) = r(t), which would imply that r is weakly dominated, a
 contradiction.
 Let -9'(t') =hi for all t.'. Since a is not weakly dominated at (t1), we get
 either
 (i) [u,(g(, a') , oi(t,)) - UJ(g((r -l(ri), o(tj))]dq(t ~t1) > 0 for somel i
 or
 (ii) { [U(g(- (J) &(1)) - Uo(g(r -, ('), &())]dq(t, I 1) 0 for all a-
 Let y1 g(-i, a) and Y2 =(a a
 Case i
 Substituting for yj and ye in inequality i yields V (y1, (t)) > V'(y2, o&(t,)). By
 hypothesis, a(ti) = &(&(ti)) is weakly dominated by -ml at ti. Let y',y. = g(a
 ro ), y~c, = g(-, r). Here, y'ju is the outcome when i plays a' and all
 other agents play (r- , and y2, is the outcome when i plays i-r, and all other
 agents play 9. Note that a, = since a is a constant strategy.
 Replacing d(-/ with -(r in (Al) then yields V (y I u, 1) < V'(y,, ti). For any
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 i, lets = g(( ', o'), yeah = g((T i'), so that y1(, is the outcome when 1
 plays dA and all other agents use deceptions 13, and similarly for y'(
 Replacing d(- with -(rein (Al) yields V (y cxp, 4I) < V'(y (xp, t) for all ,
 Next, note that for any ,B with ,3' = &', y1 = y/l~ and Y2[i y'Sp. We have thus
 shown the existence of yi and y) with
 V'(y , 0t'(1)) > V'(Y2,
 and
 V (yI, ti) - V'(y2, 4i) for all IB with 3' =('
 To complete case i, it must also be the case that V'(g(, vi), - ) > V (g(Cy
 r-'), t,) for some -T. Let zI = g(d-', ') and Z2 = g(d ', or())' Then V'(z, t) >
 Vi(z2, t). Repeating the argument above, we get V'(z1, 4)- V'(z2, 4) for all P
 with ' = .
 We have thus shown that there exist i, ti4l, y, z1, and z9 such that
 V'(Y (It) > Vi(Y2,~t)
 V' (Y I P3, ) V' (Y2, t, )
 for any deception f with f3 = oII
 V 4(zI,) > V (z.(,),
 and
 V' (Z I , ti) >_ V' (Y 2 P,
 for any deception ,3 with 3' =t'. This is precisely the requirement in condi-
 tion b.
 Case ii
 In this case,
 VI(g(d -', &r), &-(ti)) = V'(g(&,, a), a(4))
 for all CT-'. Since Dr weakly dominates a., we must have
 V(g(f, J), 4) > V'(g(bfi, o(T ), 4i) for some Dr
 and
 Vi(g(~4(, Ti), t) ? V'(g((', (j, t) for all P with 3 a
 Letting y2 g(,(-, Dr) and yI = g(- ', c), we get
 V (y I, ()) = V(Y2, Ct(l))
 V (yi, ti) < V'(y2, ti),
 and
 V' (Y I At)'V' (Y 2 0,
 for any deception f3 with P3 = .' This is the requirement in condition c and
 concludes the proof.
 Proof of Claim in Example 3
 We prove the claim in two parts: (A) If 'f is a Bayesian equilibrium to (VI, g)
 with g(a) = x, then or, is a Bayesian equilibrium. (B) If a is an undominated
 Bayesian equilibrium to (M, g), with g(a) = x, then a, is undominated.
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 Proof of Part A
 Suppose that everyone except i uses the strategy (- = (tb) regardless of
 type. Then the outcome depends (at most) only on i's type. Regardless of i's
 type, i prefers b to a since the others are both likely to be t'ds. Hence a cr'(to)
 regardless of i's type is a best response to Q. QE.D.
 Proof of Part B
 This is more involved and requires meticulous checking that none of the
 conditions a, b, and c of theorem 3 are satisfied. Since part A of the proof
 already implies that condition a is not satisfied, we need only show that condi-
 tions b and c are not satisfied. In this simple example, the proof reduces to
 showing that there does not exist a pair of allocations yI, ye) such that
 V'(yI, tb) > Vi(Y2, tb) but VI(y1p, 4) c V'(y2, t4) V f with 1' = a&. (A2)
 This can be proved in a series of steps. First, without loss of generality, fix
 = 3.
 Step 1.- It suffices to show that there do not exist allocation rules y: T- 3 A
 (i.e., allocation rules that are constant in player 3's type) such that V3(yl, t1)
 > V(y2, t1)) but V3(y1-3, 4) ' V3(y2P-:,, to) for all -
 Proof.-This follows immediately from the fact that both inequalities of
 (A2) hold the argument of yl and T2 corresponding to player 3's type fixed at
 tI,. Q.E.D.
 Thus we are reduced to a search of all pairs yI and y2 that can be repre-
 sented by 2 x 2 outcome matrices, as follows:
 Player I's Player 2's type Player I's Player 2's type
 type t4 to, type t4 th
 toI NI(t,,, te,, I (t,,, ,ti, te, y2(t,,, t,,) Y2)(t,,, tW
 tb Y I(4x, Io ,(t4,, , ti, Y2(tb, ta, Y2(tb, th,)
 Y1iT
 The remainder of the proof involves a demonstration that there is no way
 to fill in the matrices above with a's and b's in such a way that (A2) is satisfied.
 Step 2.-If some entry in y2 is a, the corresponding entry in Ti is a; that is,
 Y2(t - X) = a 4 y I (tQ ) = a for all t _ i.
 Proof. -Suppose that y2(t^_) = a but that y1(h ) = b for some _ _. Then the
 second inequality of (A2) is violated for the P` that projects to L__; that is,
 3-P~~i)= Q for all tI Q.E.D.
 Step 3. -y2( - i) = b and y I (Q ) = a for some ti.
 Proof -If not, then y1 = Y2, so the first inequality of (A2) is violated. Q.E.D.
 Step 4. y2(t -) = b for all t_-
 Proof. -Suppose thaty2(t,,, 0) = a. Then by step 2,y (I,,, t,,) = a, and by step
 3 there exists K, i $X (ta, 4) such that y2(-) b and y (L) a. There are three
 possibilities:
 t4, tj, t, tb
 (I) to sl . t, a
 t/o 0 * tj b
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 ta tb t, tb
 (II) ta a a ta a b
 tb tb
 t4 tb t, tb
 (III) Ia a t, a
 tb a tb b
 Case I violates the second inequality of (A2) for Pi given by
 PI': f3'(ta) = tb, PIN(tb) = 4. (player 1 [row] flips),
 p2: p2(ta) = la, 2(tb) = ta (player 2 [column] projects to ta).
 Similarly, case II violates the second inequality of (A2) for P- given by
 f3(ta) = ta, P3I(tb) = ta (player 1 [row] projects to ta),
 132(ta) = tb, ,32(tb) = ta (player 2 [column] flips).
 To see that case III cannot occur, we know from I and II that case III must be
 t, tb t, tb
 t, a a to a a
 tb a a tb a b
 Al Y2
 This violates the second inequality of (A2) for 13 given by
 ,B'(ta) = 32 (ta) = tb, PIN(tb) = 2(tb) = ta (both players flip).
 Hence, Y2(ta, Ia) 7# a. Similar arguments may be used to show that y2(t -) # a
 for t-i = (ta, tb), (tb, ta), and (tb, tb). QE.D.
 Step 5.-y1(t_ i) = a for some t -.i
 Proof.-If not, then yl = Y2. Q.E.D.
 Step 6. -y(t- ) = a for all t_-.
 Proof. -Suppose that YI(ta, ta) = a. Then it is easy to show that yI(Ioi, tb) a
 and (Ib, ta) = a, by arguments as in cases I and II of step 4. In fact, if yI(t)
 a for any ti, then we must have yI(ti) = a for "adjacent" t- (i.e., t, and t1,
 differ in only one component). Hence step 6 follows almost immediately from
 step 5. Q.E.D.
 Steps 1-6 imply that yI(ti) = a and y2(t-i) = b for all hI. However, this
 violates the first inequality of (A2). Therefore, there do not exist any (yI, y2)
 pairs satisfying (A2), so x is not implementable. Q.E.D.
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